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In the final days of World War II, February 1945, the Big Three allies ? Franklin Roosevelt (US), Joseph Stalin (USSR), and Winston Churchill (U.K.) met in Yalta, in a former Tsarist palace on the Black Sea in the Soviet Crimea. ...
In the final days of World War II, February 1945, the Big Three allies ? Franklin Roosevelt (US), Joseph Stalin (USSR), and Winston Churchill (U.K.) met in Yalta, in a former Tsarist palace on the Black Sea in the Soviet Crimea. Each man had his own perceptions and goals. Roosevelt failed to see Stalin and the Soviet Union as a post-war enemy resolutely hostile to Western free market democratic nations. Certain agreements made at Yalta had a damaging effect on Central Europe and the post-war world.
At Yalta Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had different concerns. Churchill was wary of Stalin and of communism and envisioned an Anglo-American alliance against Soviet aggression. The history of Anglo-American friendship and the similarity of tradition and government reinforced this expectation. Churchill wanted to guarantee free elections in Poland and Central Europe and to define Poland?s Western border, because the ?Soviet menace ? had replace the Nazi foe.?[1] Nevertheless, even Churchill?s policies toward Stalin and toward the Soviet threat to the post-war world were inconsistent and uncertain.[2]
Roosevelt was the most powerful of the Big Three, but his goals were the least clear. He wanted the Soviets to finish the war in Germany and Central Europe and to enter the war with Japan in order to save American lives, and he wanted his four policemen peace plan for the post-war world ? Great Britain, The Soviet Union, The United States and China cooperating to police the world. For these goals Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice Poland, Central Europe and parts of the Far East to Soviet expansion.[4]Roosevelt ignored the post-war menace of Soviet expansionism although there were many advisors who saw the post-war danger, and many events which demonstrated the aggressiveness and untrustworthiness of the Soviets.
The Soviet-Nazi pact to divide up Central Europe and the Soviet invasion of Poland and the invasion and bombing of Finland were clear and abundant demonstrations of Stalin?s post-war intentions. In 1943 it was found that the Soviets had murdered 10,000 Polish army officers at Katyn forest in Poland in order to prepare for the intended Soviet domination of Poland. [5] During the Warsaw uprising the Soviet army waiting outside the city was instructed by Stalin to stall Soviet promised aid in the uprising against the Germans so that these people who were demonstrating the will and ability to rise up would be killed and therefore pose less threat to the Soviets in Poland after the war. The calculating and ruthless nature of those strategies to dominate Central Europe was plenty of warning of the serious post-war Soviet threat.[6]
Phin Upham is an investor who lives in NYC and San Francisco. He has studied at Harvard University and Wharton Business School (UPenn) and is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.